The Execution of an Arbitration Provision as a Condition Precedent to Medical Treatment: Legally Enforceable? Medically Ethical? by Ginsberg, Marc D.
Mitchell Hamline Law Review
Volume 42 | Issue 1 Article 20
2016
The Execution of an Arbitration Provision as a
Condition Precedent to Medical Treatment:
Legally Enforceable? Medically Ethical?
Marc D. Ginsberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mitchell Hamline Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Ginsberg, Marc D. (2016) "The Execution of an Arbitration Provision as a Condition Precedent to Medical Treatment: Legally
Enforceable? Medically Ethical?," Mitchell Hamline Law Review: Vol. 42: Iss. 1, Article 20.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/20
8. Ginsberg (273-318) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2016 9:51 AM 
 
273 
THE EXECUTION OF AN ARBITRATION PROVISION AS 
A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT: 
LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE? MEDICALLY ETHICAL? 
Marc D. Ginsberg† 
I.  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 274 
II.  REFLECTIONS ON THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP ... 276 
III.  ARBITRATION DEFINED .......................................................... 277 
IV.  ARBITRATION, HISTORICALLY ................................................ 278 
V.  THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (FAA) ............................... 279 
VI.  FUNDAMENTAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES ................................. 283 
A. Contracts of Adhesion ........................................................ 283 
B. Unconscionability .............................................................. 284 
VII.  SURVEYING THE STATES ......................................................... 285 
A. Tennessee .......................................................................... 285 
B. Mississippi ........................................................................ 290 
C. Utah ................................................................................. 294 
D. Florida .............................................................................. 297 
E. Nevada ............................................................................. 298 
F. Arizona ............................................................................ 300 
G. Hawaii ............................................................................. 302 
H. What Have We Learned So Far? ........................................ 304 
VIII.  THE MEDICAL PROFESSION HAS SUPPORTED BINDING 
ARBITRATION OF MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMS ....................... 305 
IX.  IS THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING PATIENTS TO EXECUTE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AS A CONDITION OF 
TREATMENT MEDICALLY ETHICAL?........................................ 308 
A. The Hippocratic Oath ........................................................ 308 
B. American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical 
Ethics ............................................................................... 311 
 
        †   Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School (Chicago). 
B.A., M.A., J.D., LL.M., (Health Law). The author thanks Professors Karen Halver-
son Cross and Gerald Berendt for their excellent counsel on the topic of arbitra-
tion. The author thanks his wife, Janice, for her inspiration and support. The au-
thor also thanks his research assistant, Ms. Tyler Duff, for her assistance in 
research, proofreading, and citation checking. 
1
Ginsberg: The Execution of an Arbitration Provision as a Condition Preceden
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
8. Ginsberg (273-318) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2016  9:51 AM 
274 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:273 
C. American College of Physicians (ACP) Ethics Manual ........ 314 
D. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) Code 
of Ethics and Professionalism for Orthopedic Surgeons ......... 315 
X.  PATIENT LITERACY ................................................................. 316 
XI.  CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 317 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]he practice of medicine is not a business and can 
never be one . . . . Our fellow creatures cannot be dealt 
with as a man deals in corn and coal . . . .”1 
 
“The virtue-based physician could never see his patient as 
a ‘customer,’ consumer, insured life or any other com-
mercialized, industrialized transformations of the ancient 
and respectable word ‘patient.’”2 
 
“Patients have always been consumers. Before health in-
surance was common, they shopped in a market for medi-
cal services just as they shopped in a market for toasters 
and tailors.”3 
 
In January 2011, a patient, a not yet pregnant mother (and her 
husband), went to a medical office in Florida seeking obstetrical 
care.4 Upon becoming a patient of the office, she executed an arbi-
tration agreement covering medical liability claims. Florida has a 
statute providing for voluntary arbitration of medical negligence 
claims but she never requested arbitration pursuant to this statute.5 
Although she “willingly signed the arbitration agreement,”6 which 
stated, “the parties waive the right to a jury trial and consent to ar-
bitrate all claims arising out of or related to medical care and 
 
 1.  THE QUOTABLE OSLER 53 (Mark E. Silverman et al. eds., 2008). 
 2.  Edmund D. Pellegrino, Professionalism, Profession and the Virtues of the Good 
Physician, 69 MT. SINAI J. MED. 382, 382 (2002). 
 3.  Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, 
and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 644 (2008). 
 4.  Santiago v. Baker, 135 So. 3d 569, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 5.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.207 (West 2011). 
 6.  Santiago, 135 So. 3d at 571. The opinion states that “[the] record reflects 
no coercion or duress.” Id. 
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treatment,”7 one wonders if the execution of the arbitration 
agreement was a condition of treatment;8 an assumption to which I 
will adhere for the purposes of this paper. 
The patient had been taking a medication “to treat a chronic 
disease.”9 She took an at-home pregnancy test, which returned a 
positive result.10 The clinic, however, advised the patient “that the 
pregnancy was nonviable,”11 and recommended a D & C proce-
dure,12 which the patient refused. The patient “resumed taking the 
drug, allegedly believing that spontaneous passage of the fetus 
would occur.”13 The patient “also alleged that she was unaware of 
the possible adverse effects the drug might have on a fetus.”14 In 
fact, the patient remained pregnant and gave birth to a child with 
severe birth defects.15 
Thereafter, the patient and her husband sued the clinic and 
her attending physician for medical negligence. The clinic “suc-
cessfully moved to compel arbitration.”16 The order compelling ar-
bitration was appealed and the trial court’s order was affirmed on 
appeal.17 
Is it reasonable for a physician to condition treatment upon 
the patient’s execution of an arbitration agreement? Is such an 
agreement enforceable? Is such an agreement medically ethical? 
This paper will address these topics (and others) in an effort to de-
termine whether a treatment conditioned upon the execution of 
an arbitration agreement covering medical liability claims is con-
sistent with, and should be a defensible component of the physi-
cian-patient relationship. 
 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  The Santiago occurrence at least suggested so. There, the Court stated: 
“this agreement may reflect Dr. Baker’s ‘intention’ to require her patients to fore-
go their constitutional rights in order to receive medical service.” Id. at 572. 
 9.  Id. at 570. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Santiago, 135 So. 3d at 570. 
 12.  Id. “D&C is a surgical procedure in which the cervix is opened (dilated) 
and a thin instrument is inserted into the uterus. This instrument is used to remove 
tissue from the inside of the uterus (curettage).” The American College of Obste-
tricians & Gynecologists, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: SPECIAL PROCEDURES (May, 
2012), http://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Dilation-and-Curettage-DandC.  
 13.  Santiago, 135 So. 3d at 570. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
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II. REFLECTIONS ON THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP 
Before examining the arbitration process and the practice of 
conditioning medical treatment on the execution of an arbitration 
agreement, it is useful to examine the physician-patient relation-
ship, at least in part from the patient’s perspective. The patient ar-
rives at a physician’s office and is required to provide medical in-
formation to the office by completing forms. This process may be 
challenging due to well-described general-literacy and health-
literacy issues.18 Nevertheless, the patient will complete a medical 
history and provide medical insurance information. These forms 
are significant as they relate to treatment and billing. It is hoped, 
and, perhaps, it is reasonable to expect that patients are able to 
comprehend the forms and complete them, or ask for assistance in 
order to do so. Historically, patients have provided this information 
to physicians’ offices. Despite literacy issues, it is the custom and 
practice involving the creation of the physician-patient relation-
ship. Frankly, I do not believe that the formation of the physician-
patient relationship contemplates the execution of a legal docu-
ment—an arbitration agreement—which will so affect the legal 
rights of the patient, should a claim for medical liability arise. 
It has been keenly observed that, “[t]he patient is not just a 
group of symptoms, damaged organs and altered emotions. The 
patient is a human being, at the same time worried and hopeful, 
who is searching for relief, help and trust.”19 As will be discussed 
later in this paper, various codes and principles of medical ethics, 
which will neither bind physicians nor courts,20 implore, or at least 
encourage, physicians to act as patient advocates and assist with pa-
tient access to health care. It is fair to question whether condition-
ing treatment on the execution of an arbitration provision is con-
sistent with the patient advocacy role of the physician. 
Some years ago, Ezekiel and Linda Emanuel outlined “four 
models of the patient-physician interaction,”21 the paternalistic 
 
 18.  Ruth Parker, Health literacy: A Challenge for American Patients and Their 
Health Care Providers, 15 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L. 277, 277 (2000). 
 19.  R. Kaba & P. Sooriakumaran, The Evolution of the Doctor-Patient Relation-
ship, 5 INT’L J. SURGERY 57, 57 (2007). 
 20.  See Smith v. Radecki, 238 P.3d 111, 115–16 (Ala. 2010) (noting that the 
AMA’s ethics guidelines are “a non-binding code for ethical behavior by member 
physicians.”); Bryson v. Tinninghast, 749 P.2d 110, 114 (Okla. 1988) (noting that 
medical “ethical standards are aspirational in nature and not enforceable by law). 
 21.  Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L., Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relation-
4
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model, the informative model, the interpretive model, and the de-
liberative model.22 The paternalistic model envisions the physician 
as guardian.23The informative model contemplates the physician as 
a fact provider, allowing the patient to utilize his or her values in 
opting for treatment.24 The interpretive model contemplates that 
the physician will assist the patient “in elucidating and articulating 
his or her values and in determining what medical interventions 
best realize the specified values, thus helping to interpret the pa-
tient’s values for the patient.”25 The deliberative model contem-
plates “the physician . . . as a teacher or friend, engaging the pa-
tient in dialogue on what course of action would be best.”26 
These models represent reasonable approaches to the physi-
cian-patient relationship. These models largely involve the physi-
cian assisting the patient with health care decision-making. They do 
not involve the physician attempting to alter the legal relationship 
with the patient by compelling the execution of an arbitration 
agreement. 
Having reflected on the physician-patient relationship, it is 
time to leave this topic and commence the examination of arbitra-
tion. The physician-patient relationship will be re-examined later in 
this paper. 
III. ARBITRATION DEFINED 
Prior to a discussion of arbitration in the context of medical li-
ability claims, there is value in defining the concept. Quite funda-
mentally, arbitration, along with negotiation and mediation, is a 
form or model of alternative dispute resolution.27 More specifically, 
it has been defined “as a process for hearing and deciding contro-
versies of economic consequence arising between parties”28 which 
“begins with and depends upon an agreement of the parties to 
submit their claims to one or more persons chosen by them to 
 
ship, 267 JAMA 2221 (1992). 
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 2222. 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Kathleen A. Devine, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies, Participation, and 
Proposals, 11 REV. LITIG. 83, 93 (1991). 
 28.  Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration—What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1031 
(1960). 
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serve as their arbitrator.”29 Arbitration, as a form of alternative dis-
pute resolution, is intended as a substitute for trial.30 The arbitra-
tion process, consisting “of six stages; initiation, preparation, pre-
hearing conferences, hearing, [decision-making] and award”31 has 
been described in the literature.32 
It has been urged that “arbitration is an expression of party au-
tonomy.”33 The idea here is that arbitration is “a contractual and 
consensual mechanism that grants very broad freedom to the par-
ties to define the manner of dispute resolution . . . .”34 This paper 
will explore whether this arbitration characteristic realistically ap-
plies to medical negligence claims and concludes with the sugges-
tion that arbitration of medical liability claims is likely unconscion-
able and medically unethical. 
IV. ARBITRATION, HISTORICALLY 
A confession, of sorts, is appropriate here. Until I happened 
upon Santiago v. Baker,35 despite many years of representing physi-
cians in professional negligence litigation, I was unaware that phy-
sicians around the county had sought, and were seeking, from pa-
tients the execution of arbitration agreements, which would apply 
to professional negligence claims.36 This topic has received atten-
 
 29.  Id.; see also Edward C. King & Don W. Sears, The Ethical Aspects of Compro-
mise, Settlement And Arbitration, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 454, 458 (1953). 
 30.  Sturges, supra note 28 at 1032. 
 31.  John W. Cooley, Arbitration vs. Mediation—Explaining The Differences, 69 
JUDICATURE 263, 264 (1986). 
 32.  Id. at 264–66 
 33.  Gary B. Born, Keynote Address: Arbitration and the Freedom to Associate, 38 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 7, 15 (2009). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  135 So. 3d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 36.  The author’s prior professional life focused on representing physicians in 
Chicago, Illinois, a non-tort reform state. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l. Hosp., 930 
N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 2010) (finding Illinois statutes instituting caps on non-economic 
damages unconstitutional); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 
1997) (invalidating reform measures on medical review panels, medical insurance 
and damage caps); Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976) (in-
validating newly enacted statutory provisions for medical review panels and proce-
dures); see also David M. Goldhaber & David Grycz, Three Strikes and You’re Out: Illi-
nois Supreme Court Invalidates Damage Cap, 24 CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 30 (2010); Marc D. 
Ginsberg, The Locality Rule Lives! Why? Using Modern Medicine to Eradicate an Un-
healthy Law, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 321 (2013) (referring to the above cited case and lit-
erature regarding tort reform efforts in Illinois). Medical (including hospital) neg-
6
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tion in the literature,37 certainly from the 1970s,38 although, in my 
estimation, it requires more attention with a focus on the patient 
and an assessment of whether compulsory arbitration ought to be 
embraced by the physician-patient relationship. 
My point is simply that the classic use of arbitration did not 
arise in a physician-patient context. Scholarship suggests that arbi-
tration has its origins (perhaps ancient) in commercial disputes.39 
This is more than reasonable as commercial disputes are contract 
based. The physician-patient relationship has been governed by 
tort law.40 
That said, the majority of physicians are aware of the possibility 
of facing at least one medical negligence lawsuit in their respective 
careers.41 Medical negligence litigation tends to be protracted, ex-
pensive and uncomfortable.42 Compulsory arbitration of medical 
liability claims provides an alternate forum within which to resolve 
these disputes, if it is legally enforceable and medically ethical. 
V. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (FAA) 
Although the notion of medical treatment conditioned upon 
the patient’s execution of an arbitration agreement covering po-
tential medical liability claims is troublesome, it would be mislead-
ing to suggest that state law could simply outlaw this practice. The 
FAA,43 section 2, provides: 
 
ligence litigation remains quite active in Illinois. 
 37.  See Irving Ladimer & Joel Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Laws, 
Programs, Cases, 653 INS. L.J. 335 (1977); Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Poten-
tial of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203 (1996). 
 38.  See Ladimer & Solomon, supra note 37.  
 39.  See Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 
U. PA. L. REV. 132 (1934); Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbi-
tration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240 (1927). 
 40.  BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA A. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S. 
JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW § 6-2 (2000); David A. Hyman & Charles 
Silver, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Global Perspective: How Does the U.S. Do 
It?, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2012). 
 41.  Anupam Jena et al., Malpractice Risk According to Physician Specialty, 365 N. 
ENG. J. MED. 630 (2011). 
 42.  David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Five Myths of Medical Malpractice, 143 
CHEST J. 222, 226 (2013). 
 43.  9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (West 2015). It has been noted that “[t]hese sections 
comprise Chapter 1 of the FAA, which deals primarily with domestic arbitration.” 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L. J. 393, 393 n.1 
(2004). 
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A written provision in any maritime transaction or a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to set-
tle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of 
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the 
whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, ir-
revocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as ex-
ist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.44 
Section 2 of the FAA operates to preempt “state laws that inval-
idate parties’ agreements to arbitrate”45 thus reflecting a “national 
policy favoring arbitration.”46 Federal preemption of state law in 
this arena is “required by a line of Supreme Court cases dating 
from Southland Corp. v. Keating.”47 In its recent decisions, “Am. Ex-
press Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.48 and AT&T v. Concepcion,49 the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly decided that arbitration is an adequate 
forum for litigants . . . .”50 Essentially, preemption by the FAA will 
prohibit a state from refusing to enforce specific types of arbitra-
tion agreements deemed unconscionable by the state, as that ap-
proach would violate the policy of the FAA.51 Therefore, a state law 
(or state court) that targets an arbitration agreement that was exe-
cuted by a patient as a condition of medical treatment as uncon-
scionable would likely not withstand FAA scrutiny.52 There is a po-
 
 44.  9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947). 
 45.  Drahozal, supra note 43 at 393. 
 46.  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (O’Connor, J. & 
Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent was cited in Susan Randall, Judicial Atti-
tudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 
188 (2004). 
 47.  See Drahozal, supra note 43 at 394 n.3 (citing Southland, 465 U.S. 1; Doc-
tor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. V. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 
U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr.’s. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 
489 U.S. 486 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)). 
 48.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 49.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 50.  Ramona Lampley, “Underdog” Arbitration: A Plan for Transparency, 90 
WASH. L. REV., *2–3 (forthcoming, Dec. 2015). 
 51.  See Drahozal, supra note 43 at 402. 
 52.  See Fosler v. Midwest Care Ctr. II, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 1, 11–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2009) (stating, “What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to 
enforce all of its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce 
its arbitration clause. The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for that 
kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly 
8
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tential stumbling block to FAA application. The FAA only applies to 
transactions “involving commerce.”53 “Commerce” is supposedly de-
fined in Section 1 of the FAA as54: 
[C]ommerce among the several States or with foreign na-
tions, or in any Territory of the United States or in the 
District of Columbia, or between any such Territory and 
another, or between any such Territory and any State or 
foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and 
any State or Territory or foreign nation . . . .55 
This definition is not particularly helpful in determining if the 
practice of medicine involves commerce. Arguably, a physician-
patient interaction is “local,” not involving interstate commerce. As 
one court noted regarding a physician employment contract dis-
pute and the medical clinic’s effort to compel arbitration: “Instead, 
the evidence [the clinic] did present failed to demonstrate any-
thing other than that it was a local clinic, with local physicians who 
had privileges at local hospitals, and treated local patients.”56 This 
approach, in the physician contract context, was followed by an ap-
pellate court in affirming the denial of a motion to compel arbitra-
tion.57 
The modern practice of medicine is not that simplistic—it is 
not a stranger to commerce. Patients are mobile and seek treat-
ment from physicians outside of their home states. Physicians uti-
lize medical instruments, supplies and pharmaceutical products, 
which move through commerce. Payers may include insurance 
companies, which operate across the country, and Medicare, “the 
federal health insurance program.”58 Since these factors have led to 
the application of the FAA to a nursing home admission contract 
that includes a clause requiring arbitration of nursing home negli-
gence claims,59 arguably “the FAA would apply to nearly all medical 
transactions.”60 
 
contrary to the [FAA’s] language and Congress’s intent.” (citation omitted)). 
 53.  9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at § 1. 
 56.  Ark. Diagnostic Ctr. v. Tahiri, 257 S.W.3d 884, 891–92 (Ark. 2007). 
 57.  Flexon v. PHC-Jasper, Inc., 731 S.E.2d 1, 4 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 58.  What’s Medicare?, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-
change-plans/decide-how-to-get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2016). 
 59.  Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 787 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2009). See also, James C. Dunkelberger, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 
9
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There is merit to this suggestion. Courts have held, without in-
depth explanation, that medical care provided by physicians and 
clinics involves interstate commerce.61 The theory is that medical 
treatment is a component part of economic activity that involves in-
terstate commerce.62 Of course, the difficulty with this “analysis” is 
that it is non-analytical. 
On the other hand, in finding that Title III of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act63 regulates the practice of dentistry, one court 
held that various “commercial activities” of dentists, including the 
“purchase of supplies and equipment from out of state, receipt of 
payments from out of state insurers and credit card companies, and 
attendance of classes and conferences out of state . . . taken togeth-
er with the activities of other dentists similarly situated, have an ef-
fect on interstate commerce substantial enough to fall within the 
reach of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”64 
The FAA has been applied to an arbitration provision contained in 
a physician’s employment contract based on a clinic’s treatment of 
Medicare patients and receipt of Medicare payments.65 Although 
the court found other evidence lacking regarding FAA implication, 
it referred to other cases involving: (1) “acceptance of out-of-state 
and multi-state insurer reimbursements,” (2) “purchase and receipt 
of goods, equipment, medication, and services from out-of-state 
vendors,” (3) “out-of-state corporate offices,” (4) “recruitment of 
physicians from out-of-state,” (5) “service to out-of-state patients,” 
and (6) “receipt of federal funds.”66 
 
The Plight of Health Care Arbitration Agreements Under Federal Law, 2010 BYU L. REV. 
1869, 1887 (2010). 
 60.  Dunkelberger, supra note 59 at 1887. 
 61.  See Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 113 (Miss. 2006); Wilkerson v. 
Nelson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 285 n.3 (M.D.N.C. 2005). 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (West 1990). 
 64.  Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 593 (D. Me. 1995). There, the 
United States District Court for the District of Maine analyzed a claim against a 
dentist for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Maine Human 
Rights Act. Id. 
 65.  Sutcliffe v. Mercy Clinics, Inc., No. 13-1974, 2014 WL 4631406, at *4 (Io-
wa Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2014). 
 66.  Id. at *3 (citing Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 
668 (Ala. 2004); Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 
787–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); Fosler v. Midwest Care Ctr. II, Inc., 928 N.E.2d 1, 14–
15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); In re Tenet Healthcare, Ltd., 84 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. 
App. 2002)). 
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Therefore, it is fair to suggest that the practice of medicine 
“involves commerce.” However, if a state court were to decide that 
the practice of medicine is a local activity, not involving commerce, 
then the court would apply state law to determine the enforceabil-
ity of an arbitration provision covering medical negligence claims. 
That analysis will be explored when this paper surveys the devel-
opment of the law in the states. 
VI. FUNDAMENTAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES 
The potential enforcement of an arbitration provision in a 
contract for medical treatment, the execution of which is a condi-
tion precedent of medical treatment, requires a review of basic con-
tract principles, specifically contracts of adhesion and unconscion-
ability. These topics have been well discussed in legal scholarship.67 
A. Contracts of Adhesion 
Unquestionably, the arbitration provision upon which medical 
treatment is conditioned constitutes a component part of a con-
tract of adhesion. The arbitration provision is a “standard form 
document[],” which is given to the patient on a “take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.”68 Professor Rakoff has identified the following characteristics 
that “define a model ‘contract of adhesion’”:69 
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed 
form that contains many terms and clearly purports to be a 
contract. 
(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party 
to the transaction. 
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of 
the type represented by the form and enters into these transac-
tions as a matter of routine. 
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the rep-
resentation that, except perhaps for a few identified items 
 
 67.  See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts Of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983); Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form 
Contracts: Competition and Contract Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327 (2010); 
Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—The Sliding Scale Ap-
proach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2012); Jeffrey C. Fort, Understand-
ing Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 765 (1978); JOSEPH M. 
PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (6th ed. 2009). 
 68.  See Rakoff, supra note 67 at 1177; see also PERILLO, supra note 67 at 348. 
 69.  Rakoff, supra note 67 at 1177. 
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(such as the price term), the drafting party will enter into the 
transaction only on the terms contained in the document. This 
representation may be explicit or may be implicit in the situa-
tion, but it is understood by the adherent. 
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are 
open to bargaining, the document is signed by the adherent. 
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type 
represented by the form—few, at least, in comparison with the 
drafting party. 
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the 
transaction considered as a whole is the payment of money.70 
Although these characteristics apply more specifically to com-
mercial agreements, they also apply “in the consumer context, 
where they . . . are contracts of adhesion that consumers neither 
read nor have the power to negotiate.”71 Required arbitration of 
medical liability claims is a derivative of the consumer contract of 
adhesion. 
Contracts of adhesion are not necessarily unenforceable.72 Un-
enforceability is typically a function of unconscionability, the basics 
of which will be addressed now. 
B. Unconscionability 
Unconscionability, as a contract defense, seems to require ex-
treme unfairness. Unconscionability has been well described as fol-
lows: 
Typically the cases in which courts have found uncon-
scionability involve gross overall one-sidedness or gross 
one-sidedness of a term . . . . In these cases, one-sidedness 
is often coupled with the fact that the imbalance is buried 
in small print and often couched in language unintelligi-
ble to even a person of moderate education.73 
There are two categories of unconscionability: procedural and 
substantive. “[P]rocedural unconscionability targets the quality of   
. . . assent to the contract,”74 proof of which is “evidence of ‘oppres-
sion’ and ‘unfair surprise’ indicating that the transaction lacked 
 
 70.  See Id. 
 71.  Patterson, supra note 67 at 332.  
 72.  See Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev. 
1985). 
 73.  Perillo, supra note 67, at 339. 
 74.  Lonegrass, supra note 67, at 10. 
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meaningful choice on the part of the complaining party.”75 
“[S]ubstantive unconscionability targets the content of the terms 
themselves by looking for unfairness in the contract’s substantive 
provisions.”76 Here, the focus is “on whether the allocation of risks 
in the contract or one of its terms is commercially unreasonable or 
unexpectedly one-sided.”77 The classic application of the uncon-
scionability analysis requires a finding of both procedural and sub-
stantive unconscionability,78 but “[t]he most troubling cases are 
those in which there is overwhelming evidence of one form of un-
conscionability and little evidence of the other form.”79 
With this basic review of fundamental contract principles, this 
paper now surveys states in which compulsory arbitration of medi-
cal liability claims has been sought, accepted, and rejected. 
VII. SURVEYING THE STATES 
A. Tennessee 
In Buraczynski v. Eyring, the Tennessee Supreme Court consid-
ered, as a case of first impression, the enforceability of an arbitra-
tion provision foisted upon a patient by a physician.80 Buraczynski is 
an appropriate case with which to begin the survey of states, as it 
involves all of the legal and policy issues implicated by the topic.81 
Procedurally, it involves the consolidation of two appeals concern-
ing identical legal issues. 
Two patients of Dr. Eyring, an orthopedic surgeon, engaged 
him to perform total knee replacement surgery.82 They suffered 
complications, resulting in medical negligence claims against him.83 
 
 75.  Id. at 9 (citing U.C.C. § 2-302 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2015)). 
 76.  Id. at 10. 
 77.  Id. at 10–11 (citation omitted). 
 78.  See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Uncon-
scionability: An Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1067, 1073 
(Summer, 2006). 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Buraczynski v. Evring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tenn. 1996). 
 81.  See id. at 314–22. 
 82.  Id. at 316. One of the patients, Helen Parker, was the subject of another 
case involving Dr. Eyring’s challenge to “the revocation of his staff appointment 
and clinical privileges.” Eyring v. Fort Sanders Parkwest Med. Ctr., 991 S.W.2d 230, 
232 (Tenn. 1999). 
 83.  See generally Robert B. Bourne et al., Patient Satisfaction after Total Knee Ar-
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Dr. Eyring required each patient to execute a “Physician-Patient 
Arbitration Agreement.”84 Medical treatment was conditioned upon 
the execution of the agreements, although, one of the patients ex-
ecuted her agreement post-surgery.85 The agreement, by its terms, 
was retroactive to previous treatment provided to her by Dr. Eyring, 
including the knee replacement procedure.86 The Court highlight-
ed the details of the agreements as follows: 
The agreements are identical in all respects and require 
arbitration of any and all medical malpractice claims by 
the patient against the doctor. The provisions bind all po-
tential parties, including the patient’s spouse and heirs, 
on all claims for medical negligence. In return, the physi-
cian is bound by the arbitrators’ malpractice decision, in-
cluding any fee claims involved in the disputed treatment. 
Finally, the patient has an unconditional right to revoke 
the agreement by providing written notice to the physi-
cian within thirty (30) days of signing.87 
The court’s opinion related other details of the compulsory 
arbitration agreements. Each patient executed a single-page arbi-
tration agreement.88 “A short explanation was attached to each 
document which encouraged the patient to discuss questions about 
the agreement with [Dr.] Eyring.”89 The arbitration provision con-
templated three arbitrators and required the patient and Dr. 
Eyring to each choose an arbitrator. Those arbitrators would select 
a third arbitrator.90 The arbitrators’ decision bound Dr. Eyring and 
the patients were advised that they are waiving their rights “‘to a ju-
ry or court trial’ on any medical malpractice claim.”91 The Court 
emphasized that “[f]inally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
agreements did not change the doctor’s duty to use reasonable 
 
throplasty: Who is Satisfied and Who is Not?, 468 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED 
RES. 57 (Jan. 2010); Paul F. Fortin et al., Outcomes of Total Hip and Knee Replacement: 
Preoperative Functional Status Predicts Outcomes at Six Months After Surgery, 42 
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 1722 (Aug. 1999); James E. Lovelock et al., Complications 
of Total Knee Replacement, 142 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 985 (May 1984). 
 84.  Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 317 (noting that “the agreements signed by 
[the patients] were presented to them on a ‘take it or leave it basis’”). 
 85.  Id. at 316–17. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id at 317. 
 88.  Id. at 321. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
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care in treating patients, nor limit liability for breach of that duty, 
but merely shifted the disputes to a different forum.”92 
Following the filing of the medical negligence actions, the de-
fendants moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the 
motions, basing that decision on the incompatibility of the arbitra-
tion agreement with the Tennessee arbitration statute93 and insuffi-
cient contract consideration.94 The cases were consolidated on ap-
peal and the trial court’s judgment was reversed.95 The Court of 
Appeals held “that the nature of the physician-patient relationship 
is unique and not a typical contractual relationship,”96 that the 
Tennessee arbitration statute was applicable97 and “found sufficient 
consideration98 to support the agreements in question.”99 The Su-
preme Court of Tennessee “granted this appeal to consider an im-
portant question of first impression—the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements between physicians and patients.”100 In its opinion, 
the court addressed the related issues of public policy,101 breadth of 
the application of the arbitration agreements,102 and contracts of 
adhesion.103 
As to public policy, the Supreme Court stated “that no court 
has ever reached the broad conclusion that public policy precludes 
the use of private arbitration agreements in the area of medical 
services.”104 This statement suggests the lack of an overarching 
principle that would require a finding that the arbitration provi-
sions were unenforceable. Although recognizing the “unique na-
ture of the physician-patient relationship,”105 without explaining it, 
the court held that arbitration is “advantageous,”106 not limiting po-
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-302(a) (West 2015). 
 94.  Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 317. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.3 (2d ed. 1998). 
 99.  Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 317. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 318. 
 102.  Id. at 319. 
 103.  Id. at 320. 
 104.  Id. at 318 (citing Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the En-
forcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REV. 947, 949 
(1972)). 
 105.  Id. at 319. 
 106.  Id. 
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tential liability,107 and designating a forum for dispute resolution.108 
As such, the court pronounced “that arbitration agreements be-
tween physicians and patients are not per se void as against public 
policy.”109 
As to the breadth of the arbitration provisions, the court simp-
ly dismissed the argument that the provision must be treatment or 
procedure specific, citing California precedent.110 Rather curiously, 
this precedent suggests that requiring a treatment or procedure-
specific arbitration provision would burden the physician and 
emasculate the arbitration process111 by forcing the physician to 
seek the execution of a new arbitration provision with each change 
of the treatment regimen. Does that reasoning suggest that com-
pulsory arbitration places no burden on the patient? 
Begging the question of “patient understanding,” the court 
had no difficulty with the retroactive effect of the arbitration provi-
sion which was executed after the patient received the medical 
treatment which was the subject of the claim. Here, the court simp-
ly concluded that because the patient “initialed the clause which 
applied to the previously rendered treatment,” she “was therefore 
obviously aware of it.”112 It is necessary to remember that Buraczynski 
concerns “take it or leave it” arbitration.113 The patient has no 
choice but to execute the agreement or find other treatment. Un-
der these circumstances, whether the patient is “obviously aware” of 
the arbitration provision, its meaning, or arbitration process is 
questionable, and will be the subject of discussion in this article. 
Turning to its discussion and analysis of adhesion contracts, 
the court emphasized the “take it or leave it”114 character, i.e., re-
quired acquiescence,115 and that the patient “has no realistic 
choice”116 of contract terms. The court concluded that the subject 
arbitration agreements were adhesion contracts because: “the 
agreements are standardized form contracts prepared by the con-
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. (citing Hilleary v. Garvin, 238 Cal. Rptr. 247 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 111.  Id. at 319. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See id. at 317 (stating “had the patients refused to sign, [the doctor] 
would not have continued to treat them”). 
 114.  Id. at 320. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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tracting party” the contracting physician has “superior knowledge 
of the subject matter—the rendition of medical services,” and the 
physician conceded the take it or leave it basis of the agreement (a 
patient refusing to sign would no longer receive medical care).117 
Of course, the court noted that it’s finding that the arbitration pro-
visions were contracts of adhesion did not require a finding of un-
enforceability.118 
Moving to the question of enforceability, the court emphasized 
that its characterization of the arbitration agreements as contracts 
of adhesion did not make the agreements unenforceable.119 Here, 
the court stated that “[e]nforceability generally depends upon 
whether the terms of the contract are beyond the reasonable ex-
pectations of an ordinary person, or oppressive or unconsciona-
ble.”120 Unfortunately, the court did not state that patient literacy or 
medical ethics were factors to consider. These factors will be ad-
dressed later in some detail. 
Instead, the court focused on whether the arbitration provi-
sions were hidden, “not afford[ing] the patients an opportunity to 
question the terms or purpose of the agreement.”121 Remarkably, 
the court concluded that the provisions were quite fair, for the fol-
lowing reasons: the arbitration agreements were separate, entitled 
documents; attached explanations suggested that the patients dis-
cuss their questions about the agreements with the physician; the 
specified arbitration procedure was fair; the language of the 
agreement informed the patient of the waiver of a court or jury tri-
al; there were no hidden terms; the “retroactivity” provision was 
separate and required the patient to initial it; the patients could re-
voke the agreements within 30 days of execution; and the agree-
ments did not alter Dr. Eyring’s duty to exercise reasonable care.122 
Finally, the court proclaimed that “[n]one of the above de-
scribed provisions can be construed as unconscionable, oppressive, 
or outside the reasonable expectations of the parties. As such, the 
agreements, though contracts of adhesion, are enforceable.”123 Of 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. (citing Broemmer v. Abortion Serv.’s of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 
1016 (Ariz. 1992)). 
 121.  Id. at 321. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. at 320 
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course this proclamation was not based upon any analysis of the 
reasonable expectation of a patient—a layperson. Should a patient 
expect an arbitration agreement as a condition of treatment? What 
is the likelihood that a patient could understand a legal document 
that profoundly affects the patient’s legal rights?124 This issue in 
“legal literacy”125 compounds well-known and reported problems in 
general and health literacy—problems that make physician-patient 
communication a challenge.126 Furthermore, the court did not con-
sider the medical ethics of the compulsory arbitration agreement. 
Instead, the Buraczynski court equates the physician-patient en-
counters with arms-length business transactions—a misguided no-
tion.127 
B. Mississippi 
In Cleveland v. Mann, the Supreme Court of Mississippi placed 
its stamp of approval on an arbitration agreement, the execution of 
which may have been compelled.128 Here, the defendant-physician, 
a surgeon, treated the patient for stomach cancer. The treatment 
provided was a total gastrectomy.129 Following that procedure, at a 
subsequent appointment for follow-up treatment for an apparent 
surgical complication, an arbitration agreement was presented to 
the patient.130 The patient executed the agreement and follow-up 
surgery was performed nineteen days later.131 The patient required 
 
 124.  See generally James Boyd White, The Invisible Discourse of the Law: Reflections 
on Legal Literacy and General Education, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 143 (1983) (discussing 
the “degree of competence in legal discourse required for meaningful and active 
life in our increasingly legalistic and litigious culture”). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See Mark V. Williams et al., The Role of Health Literacy in Patient-Physician 
Communication, 34 FAM. MED. 383 (May 2002). 
 127.  Buraczynski, 919 S.W.2d at 320. 
 128.  Cleveland v. Mann, 942 So. 2d 108, 116 (Miss. 2006). “However, the par-
ties dispute whether the agreement was presented on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.” 
Id. The dissent referred to the arbitration agreement as “offered to the patient as a 
prerequisite to necessary medical treatment.” Id. at 121. 
 129.  Id. at 110. There is considerable medical literature discussing grastecto-
my. See, e.g., Scott A. Hundahl et al., The National Cancer Data Base Report on Poor 
Survival of U.S. Gastric Carcinoma Patients Treated with Gastrectomy, 88 CANCER 921 
(2000); John R. T. Monson et al., Total Gastrectomy for Advanced Cancer, 68 CANCER 
1863 (1991); Asgaut Viste et al., Postoperative Complications and Mortality After Surgery 
for Gastric Cancer, 207 ANNALS SURGERY 7 (1988). 
 130.  Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 111. 
 131.  Id. 
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additional surgery and continued to deteriorate until his death.132 A 
medical negligence action was commenced, triggering a motion to 
compel arbitration.133 The response to this motion urged that the 
patient “did not enter into the agreement knowingly, voluntarily, 
and intelligently, and the agreement violated the Mississippi Arbi-
tration Act.”134 The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitra-
tion, based upon an unconscionable contract of adhesion,135 having 
stated that this was an issue of first impression.136 
Following its discussion of the FAA and arbitrability,137 the 
court undertook an analysis of procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability. Evidence of procedural unconscionability would in-
clude “a lack of knowledge, lack of voluntariness, inconspicuous 
print, the use of complex legalistic language, disparity in sophistica-
tion or bargaining power of the parties and/or a lack of opportuni-
ty to study the contract and inquire about the contract terms.”138 Ev-
idence of substantive unconscionability focuses on oppressive terms 
in the arbitration provision.139 
Applying these concepts, the court held that the arbitration 
agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscion-
able. Without citing any authority regarding “literacy” the court 
disposed of the argument that the patient’s “lack of education and 
inability to read or understand the agreement”140 created “a dispari-
ty in the sophistication of the parties”141 and procedural uncon-
scionability. The court referred only to its prior holding that “the 
inability to read does not render a person incapable of possessing 
adequate knowledge of the arbitration agreement he or she 
signed.”142 It seems unimaginable that the court would so readily 
 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. It should be noted that the response also raised the issue of whether 
beneficiaries of the wrongful death claim could be bound by the provision, a topic 
not addressed by this paper. For a very recent opinion on whether a non-signatory 
to an arbitration agreement may be bound by the agreement. See Fiala v. Bickford 
Senior Living Grp., 32 N.E.3d 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). 
 135.  Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 111–12. 
 136.  Id. at 113. 
 137.  Id. at 112–13. 
 138.  East Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 714 (Miss. 2002). 
 139.  Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 111–12. 
 140.  Id.at 114. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. (citing EquiFirst Corp. v. Jackson, 2005-CA-00621-SCT (¶ 19) (Miss. 
2006)). 
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dismiss or discount the relationship between reading ability and 
likelihood of understanding a legal document.143 
The court next considered the claim that the arbitration 
agreement was not explained to the patient, first by referring to the 
patient’s signature on the first page of the agreement, providing as 
follows: “NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE 
AGREEING TO HAVE ANY CLAIM OF NEGLIGENCE OR 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL BINDING 
ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR STATUTORY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT 
TRIAL.”144Additionally, the patient initialed each term, presumably 
after a medical staff member explained each term.145 
The court also referred to affidavits provided by the patient’s 
sister-in-law and the defendant-physician. The sister-in-law had ac-
companied the patient to the appointment at which the arbitration 
agreement was executed. Her testimony revealed that the patient 
asked the defendant-physician about the meaning of the arbitra-
tion agreement, to which he replied, “It’s so you won’t sue me.”146 
The physician-defendant’s affidavit indicated that the patient 
“signed the agreement and initialed his understanding on the sec-
ond page of the agreement before meeting with him.”147 The physi-
cian then met with the patient and confirmed that the patient had 
read the arbitration agreement, “had its terms explained to him, 
fully understood its terms, and consented to the surgery.”148 This 
confirmation was based on his recollection of his conversation with 
the patient and the patient’s signature and initials appearing on 
the agreement.149 
 
 143.  See Barry D. Weiss, Gregory Hart, Daniel L. McGee & Sandra D’Estelle, 
Health Status of Illiterate Adults: Relation Between Literacy and Health Status Among Per-
sons with Low Literacy Skills, 5 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 257, 257 (1992) (noting that 
millions of persons in the U.S. “lack basic reading skills” or have only “rudimentary 
reading skills that are not sufficient to permit full participation in society’s eco-
nomic and social activities.”). 
 144.  Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 114. 
 145.  See id. at 114–15 (explaining that the second page of the agreement con-
tains a statement, acknowledged by the defendant-physician’s medical staff mem-
ber, that the arbitration agreement was explained to the patient). 
 146.  Id. at 115. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See id. 
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The court next held that “[t]he language in this agreement is 
neither complex nor convoluted.”150 Here, the court relied on the 
boldness of the print, a statement in the agreement explaining its 
terms, a signature of the patient on a page of the agreement, the 
patient having initialed each term, “denoting his understanding of 
the terms”151 and the patient having initialed the agreement to in-
dicate “he was provided an opportunity to inquire about the 
agreement’s terms.”152 Then, curiously, the court stated that 
“[plaintiffs] may not escape the agreement by simply stating [the 
patient] did not read the agreement or have it read to him or un-
derstand its terms.”153 The court did not address whether this pa-
tient had the wherewithal to understand the arbitration provision, 
and simply signed a document given to him in order to receive the 
medical treatment he desired. 
The court next addressed contracts of adhesion and voluntari-
ness relating to the claim that the patient had no choice but to ex-
ecute the agreement. The court dispatched this argument, noting 
that the agreement, prepared by defense counsel, provided that the 
“[p]atient is not in need of emergency care or under immediate 
stress,”154 the patient had the right to “make written changes in the 
Arbitration Agreement if they so desire and present these to the 
Clinic for approval,”155 the patient could rescind the agreement 
within fifteen days, and that the patient’s “surgery was not sched-
uled until nineteen days after he executed the agreement . . . ,”156 
presumably to suggest that the patient had the time and resources 
to seek legal counsel to consult about arbitration. In my estimation, 
this position defies logic and, again, suggests that the patient was 
fully involved in a business transaction. Of course, the court’s posi-
tion assumes that the patient knew that he executed an arbitration 
agreement, fully understood what it meant, including the concept 
of rescission and the waiver of basic legal rights, and would have 
had the presence of mind and capability of consulting with legal 
counsel. Undoubtedly, the patient simply desired medical treat-
ment. In any event, for the aforementioned reasons, the court con-
 
 150.  Id. at115. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 115–16. 
 154.  Id. at 116. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
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cluded that the arbitration agreement did not suffer from proce-
dural unconscionability.157 
Finally, the court held the arbitration provision was not sub-
stantively unconscionable. The court believed that the arbitration 
forum was fair and that the agreement neither limited the patient’s 
legal rights or damages nor the defendant-physician’s liability.158 
Therefore, the court held that the trial court incorrectly denied the 
motion to compel arbitration, reversed the judgment, and re-
manded the case “with instructions . . . compelling the parties to 
submit their dispute to arbitration.”159 
A vigorous dissent recognized the patient’s “lack of bargaining 
power”160 and the one-sidedness of the arbitration provision,161 and 
apparently agreed with the trial court that the arbitration provision 
was a take it or leave it proposition. The dissent focused on the 
state constitutional provision of a right to trial by jury.162 It noted 
that any interference with that right, including arbitration, must be 
reviewed with strict scrutiny.163 
C. Utah 
Truth is stranger than fiction. The facts of Sosa v. Paulos,164 an 
opinion of the Supreme Court of Utah, certainly satisfy this maxim. 
Here, the patient was to undergo a posterior cruciate ligament re-
construction.165 “[L]ess than one hour prior to surgery, after Ms. 
Sosa was undressed and in her surgical clothing, ‘someone from 
Dr. Paulos’ office’ gave her three documents and asked her to sign 
them,” including an arbitration agreement.166 No one from the de-
fendant-physician’s office ever discussed the arbitration agreement 
with her and Ms. Sosa executed the agreement without reading it.167 
 
 157.  See id. 
 158.  See id. at 117. 
 159.  Id. at 119. 
 160.  Id. at 121. 
 161.  See id. 
 162.  See MISS. CONST. art. III, § 31. 
 163.  Cleveland, 942 So. 2d at 122. 
 164.  Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996). 
 165.  Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359. See, e.g., Edward L. Trickey, Rupture of the Posterior 
Cruciate Ligament of the Knee, 50 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 334 (1968) (discussing the 
mechanism of injury, physical signs of injury, treatment, surgical approach and 
repair, and results of treatment). 
 166.  Sosa, 924 P.2d at 359. 
 167.  Id. 
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At that time, the Utah Arbitration Act contemplated compul-
sory arbitration.168 The patient believed that she was required to 
sign the agreement as a condition of the treatment.169 Utah public 
policy favored arbitration agreements, including those between 
physicians and patients.170 
Post-operatively, the patient suffered a complication and later 
commenced a medical negligence action.171 The trial court denied 
the defendant-physician’s motion to stay and compel arbitration, 
finding the arbitration agreement “procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable.”172 
The arbitration agreement executed by the patient was quite 
detailed, covering “all conceivable claims,”173 providing an arduous 
cost-shifting process,174 a fourteen day revocation provision in favor 
of the patient,175 a declaration of patient understanding,176 severa-
bility in the event of an unenforceable provision177 and the patient’s 
waiver of the right to a jury or court trial.178 It should be empha-
sized that the patient was confronted with this arbitration agree-
ment less than one hour before surgery.179 
The court undertook a discussion of substantive and proce-
dural unconscionability. As to substantive unconscionability—
focusing on the terms of the arbitration agreement—the court fo-
cused on the requirement that the arbitrators would be orthopedic 
surgeons and the circumstance in which the patient would be re-
quired to absorb the arbitration fees.180 In, regrettably, analogizing 
the physician-patient relationship to a business transaction, the 
court noted that “[t]he terms of the contract should be considered 
 
 168.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-3 (1992), repealed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-
17 (West 2007) (current version at UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421 (West 2014)); So-
riano v. Graul, 186 P.3d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). The statute was subsequently 
amended to allow patients to decline arbitration and continue to receive treat-
ment. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-421 (West 2014). 
 169.  Sosa, 924 P.2d at 362. 
 170.  Id. at 359. 
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 360. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 361. 
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‘according to the mores and business practices of the time and 
place.’”181 The court held that the arbitrator selection process (neu-
trally selected orthopedic surgeons) was not biased in favor of the 
defendant-physician and was not substantively unconscionable.182 
The court, however, did hold the payment of costs provision sub-
stantively unconscionable due to cost shifting—“the award of attor-
ney fees to the loser in malpractice arbitration”183 and the embed-
ding of the provision “in a non-negotiated agreement.”184 This 
latter factor also violated Utah public policy.185 
As to procedural unconscionability, the court noted its agree-
ment “with the trial court’s conclusion that elements of procedural 
unconscionability surrounded the negotiation of this agreement.”186 
Actually, there was no negotiation. The court recognized that the 
patient was given the agreement on the precipice of surgery, when 
the patient “was already in her surgical clothing and in a state of 
fear and anxiety.”187 She did not read the arbitration agreement 
and it was not explained to her. She did not have “a meaningful 
choice with respect to signing the agreement.”188 It is laudable that 
the court recognized the patient’s pre-surgical vulnerability, anxiety 
and apprehension.189 
The court then addressed the issue of whether the patient 
could have invoked the revocation clause of the arbitration agree-
ment, giving the patient “fourteen days to unilaterally review and 
revoke the agreement.”190 Apparently, the record on appeal did not 
clearly address “whether Ms. Sosa actually received a signed copy of 
the arbitration agreement following her surgery.”191 If she had, a 
majority of the court would order the trial court to sever the un-
conscionable cost-shifting provision and enforce the remainder of 
the arbitration agreement if the patient was not “precluded from 
 
 181.  Id. (citing Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 
1985) (quoting ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 128 (1963))). 
 182.  Id. at 361. 
 183.  Id. at 362. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. at 362–63 (emphasis added). 
 187.  Id. at 363. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 364. 
 191.  Id. 
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exercising her right to revoke.”192 Why a majority of the court would 
think that a post-operative patient would be inclined to revisit an 
arbitration agreement, which the patient was likely unaware of in 
the first instance, is unexplained. Ultimately, the majority held that 
the defendant-physician’s “behavior in negotiating the agreement 
was procedurally unconscionable” and that the arbitration cost-
shifting provision was substantively unconscionable. 193 The issue on 
remand was the potential enforceability of the remainder of the ar-
bitration agreement. 
D. Florida 
The opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida in San-
tiago v. Baker194 is the opinion first referred to in this paper and is 
the opinion which piqued my interest in the compulsory arbitra-
tion of medical liability claims. Santiago involves a compulsory arbi-
tration agreement executed by an obstetrical-gynecological patient 
on her initial visit to a women’s medical practice.195 Florida had a 
statute providing for voluntary, binding arbitration of medical neg-
ligence claims196 but the patient never invoked the statute. Instead, 
upon the patient’s filing of a medical negligence claim, the de-
fendant successfully moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the 
private arbitration agreement.197 
Without detailed analysis or discussion, the court stated, “Ms. 
Santiago willingly signed the arbitration agreement. Our record re-
flects no coercion or duress.”198 In conclusory fashion, the court 
held that the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor 
substantively unconscionable.199 Santiago simply stands for the 
proposition that compulsory, private arbitration agreements be-
tween physicians and patients do not violate Florida public policy.200 
The concurring opinion focused on the waiver of the right of 
trial by jury by non-signatories to the arbitration agreement—the 
 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  135 So. 3d 569, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Medical Malpractice and Related Matters, 45 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766 (West 
2014). 
 197.  Santiago, 135 So. 3d at 570. 
 198.  Id. at 571. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. 
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patient’s husband and child—but also referred to literacy and 
health literacy by stating: 
But somehow in deference to the supposed economic ef-
ficiency of arbitration, our society seems to be more and 
more willing to allow the use of form contracts, not sub-
ject to negotiation, that force patients, the elderly, the 
marginally literate, and ordinary consumers of everyday 
products to waive their constitutional right to trial by jury 
in common law cases—before the common law cause of 
action even exists—in order to receive basic goods and 
services.201 
Nevertheless, of course, the concurrence supported the notion 
of the binding, private, compulsory arbitration agreement between 
a physician and a patient. 
Not long after Santiago, a different appellate district issued an 
unpublished opinion202 and disagreed with Santiago’s recognition of 
non-statutory medical arbitration agreements that do not adopt all 
of the statutory provisions. Presumably then, this opinion in Crespo 
v. Hernandez203 would not endorse a take-it-or-leave-it arbitration 
provision but only an agreement which provided for voluntary arbi-
tration, which could be invoked by physician or patient. 
E. Nevada 
In 1985, the Supreme Court of Nevada, in Obstetrics & Gynecol-
ogists v. Pepper, held unenforceable an arbitration agreement that a 
patient was required to execute as a condition of treatment.204 
Here, a patient appeared at a clinic seeking oral contraceptives.205 
Pursuant to the custom and practice of the clinic, the following 
would have occurred: the receptionist handed “the patient the ar-
bitration agreement along with two information sheets;”206 the re-
ceptionist informed the patient that any of the patient’s questions 
about the arbitration agreement would be answered;207 the patient 
executed the agreement as a condition of treatment;208 a physician 
 
 201.  Id. at 572. 
 202.  Crespo v. Hernandez, 151 So.3d 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Obstetrics & Gynecologists v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. at 1260. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. 
26
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 20
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/20
8. Ginsberg (273-318) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2016  9:51 AM 
2016] THE EXECUTION OF AN ARBITRATION PROVISION 299 
executed the arbitration agreement;209 and the arbitration agree-
ment did not provide the patient a right to revoke it.210 The arbitra-
tion agreement covered all disputes, provided for binding arbitra-
tion and waived the right to a trial.211 The patient signed the 
agreement although she had no recollection of doing so and no 
recollection that it was explained to her.212 
Presumably after taking the oral contraceptive, the patient 
“suffered a cerebral incident which left her partially paralyzed.”213 
She filed suit for medical negligence, urging that the oral contra-
ceptive “was contraindicated by her medical history.”214 The de-
fendant moved the court to stay the litigation and compel arbitra-
tion.215 The motions were denied and the appeal followed.216 
First, the Nevada Supreme Court embarked on a discussion of 
adhesion contracts. It focused on the “take it or leave it”217 feature 
of the agreement—an agreement “prepared by [the] . . . medical 
clinic and presented to [the patient] as a condition of treat-
ment.”218 It did note that an adhesion contract which met “the rea-
sonable expectations of the weaker . . . party and is not unduly op-
pressive”219 will be enforceable. Next, the Nevada Supreme Court 
concluded that the patient did not consent to the provisions of the 
arbitration agreement, finding no “meeting of the minds”220 and a 
lack of “informed consent.”221 This finding was based on the pa-
 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. at 1259. 
 212.  Id. at 1260. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. See  Alan B. Grindal et al., Cerebral Infarction in Young Adults, 9 STROKE 
39, 39–40 (1978) (concluding that oral contraceptive use “may” be an explanation 
for increased incidences of cerebral infarction in women of childbearing age); 
William D. Odell, An Analysis of the Reported Association of Oral Contraceptives to 
Thromboembolic Disease, 122 W. J. MED. 26, 26–32 (1975) (discussing the relationship 
between oral contraceptives and cerebral infarction). 
 215.  Pepper, 693 P.2d at 1260. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. at 1261. 
 220.  Id. “Meeting of the minds” refers to a classic theory of contract law. See 
Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpre-
tation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427 (2000); E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of 
Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939 (1967). 
 221.  “Informed consent” is typically considered the physician’s obligation to 
disclose the risks, benefits, complications of and alternatives to a recommended 
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tient’s inability to recall “receiving any information regarding the 
terms of the arbitration agreement.”222 
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
the motions to stay the action and to order arbitration. Essentially, 
the Supreme Court treated this dispute as a contract matter, with-
out a mention of general literacy, health literacy or the medical 
ethics of proposing such an agreement. 
F. Arizona 
In Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix,223 the Supreme Court 
of Arizona considered the enforceability of an arbitration agree-
ment a patient was required to execute “prior to undergoing a clin-
ical abortion.”224 The facts reveal that the patient was young, un-
married, of modest means, and the father-to-be insisted on the 
abortion—her parents wished otherwise.225 By affidavit, the patient 
“describes the time as one of considerable confusion and emotion 
and physical turmoil for her.”226 
The relevant facts of the patient’s encounter with the medical 
clinic are these: the patient “was escorted into an adjoining room 
and asked to complete three forms, one of which [was] the agree-
ment to arbitrate.”227 The arbitration agreement applied to all dis-
putes with the clinic, provided for binding arbitration and further 
provided that the arbitrators would be licensed OB-GYNs.228 The 
patient completed the forms, was not given copies of them and re-
 
treatment or procedure for a patient. See Marc. D. Ginsberg, Informed Consent and 
the Differential Diagnosis: How the Law Can Overestimate Patient Autonomy and Compro-
mise Health Care, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 349, 352 (2014) (citing Canterbury v. Spence, 
464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
 222.  Pepper, 693 P.2d at 1261. 
 223.  Broemmer v. Abortion Serv. Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013, 1013 (Ariz. 
1992). 
 224.  Id. A clinical abortion has been defined as “[a]n abortion of a clinical 
pregnancy which takes place between the diagnosis of pregnancy and 20 complet-
ed weeks’ gestational age.” Fernando Zegers-Hochschild et al, The ICMART Glossa-
ry on ART Terminology, 21 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1968, 1969 (2006). 
 225.  Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1014. 
 226.  Id. See Catherine T. Coyle, Priscilla K. Coleman & Vincent M. Rue, Inade-
quate Preabortion Counseling and Decision Conflict as Predictors of Subsequent Relationship 
Difficulties and Psychological Stress in Men and Women, 16 TRAUMATOLOGY 16 (2010) 
(providing a discussion of unplanned pregnancy as a “crisis situation”). 
 227.  Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1014. 
 228.  Id. 
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ceived no explanation of the arbitration agreement.229 The patient 
was told to return the next morning for the abortion procedure, 
which she did, and the abortion was performed. A complication 
occurred—a punctured uterus—requiring further treatment.230 It 
prompted the filing of a medical negligence complaint. 
The complaint was met by a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff sub-
mitted “uncontroverted” affidavits in response, apparently indicat-
ing that she “could recall completing and signing the medical his-
tory and consent-to-operate forms, but could not recall signing the 
agreement to arbitrate.”231 Treating the motion as one for summary 
judgment, due to the trial court’s consideration of the affidavits, 
the trial court granted summary judgment for the clinic and denied 
the patient’s motion for further relief. The court of appeals af-
firmed, holding that the arbitration agreement, despite its adhesive 
character, was “enforceable because it did not fall outside plaintiff’s 
reasonable expectations and was not unconscionable.”232 
The Arizona Supreme Court refused to broadly address the 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement, declining to establish a 
“‘bright-line rule’ of broad applicability.”233 Based on the specific, 
“undisputed facts,” the court held the arbitration agreement unen-
forceable.234 
The court had no difficulty in identifying the arbitration 
agreement as a contract of adhesion. The patient’s execution of the 
agreement was a condition of treatment, the agreement was not 
negotiated, it required the arbitrators to be OB-GYNs and its terms 
were not explained to the patient.235 The arbitration agreement, 
therefore, had all of the characteristics of a contract of adhesion.236 
Next, the court considered the reasonable expectations of the 
patient and enforceability of an adhesion contract. Here, the pa-
tient did not recall signing the agreement or having the clinic ex-
plain it to her.237 The clinic “did not show whether [the patient] was 
required to sign the form or forfeit treatment.”238 Furthermore, the 
 
 229.  Id. at 1015. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. at 1016. 
 236.  Id. at 1015. 
 237.  Id. at 1017. 
 238.  Id. The arbitration agreement is appended to the opinion as Appendix A. 
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court emphasized that the provision requiring waiver of the right to 
a jury trial was inconspicuous, and “that waiver of such fundamen-
tal rights was beyond the reasonable expectations of [the pa-
tient].”239 
Referring again to the patient’s vulnerability, the court noted 
that she “was under a great deal of emotional stress, had only a 
high school education, was not experienced in commercial matters, 
and is still not sure ‘what arbitration is.’”240 The arbitration agree-
ment was not encompassed by the patient’s reasonable expecta-
tions and was unenforceable.241 
A rather vigorous dissent suggests that the patient, “an adult, 
signed the document” and should be bound by the agreement.242 
Strangely, the dissent believes that the patient may have desired ar-
bitration and that there is no harm in the arbitration process.243 It 
noted the patient’s opportunity to read the arbitration agreement, 
which “was legible and was hardly hidden from [the patient’s] 
view.”244 
The difficulty with the dissent in Broemmer245 is that it treats the 
arbitration agreement as the result of a business-like negotiation 
between the patient and clinic. The majority recognized that the 
patient was vulnerable for many reasons, as are many patients. Pa-
tient vulnerability is a characteristic of the physician-patient rela-
tionship and poses a significant roadblock to compulsory arbitra-
tion as a condition of treatment. 
G. Hawaii 
In Siopen v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, the Supreme Court of 
Hawaii considered the enforceability of an arbitration provision 
contained in an agreement between a health care provider and a 
 
Id. at 1023. It states: “it is understood by the Patient that he or she is not required 
to use the aforesaid Doctor and that there are numerous other physicians in 
Phoenix, Arizona who are qualified to provide the same services as aforesaid Doc-
tor.” Id. This statement more than suggests that treatment was conditioned on pa-
tient’s execution of the arbitration agreement. Id. 
 239.  Id. at 1017. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. at 1018. 
 243.  Id. at 1019. 
 244.  Id. at 1020. 
 245.  Id. at 1018. 
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patient’s employer.246 The patient was a public school teacher and 
his health insurance was provided through a union health benefits 
trust fund.247 The trust fund contracted with Kaiser for health ser-
vices.248 The group agreement between Kaiser and the union con-
tained an arbitration provision, which applied to all potential 
claims against Kaiser.249 The arbitration provision contained limita-
tions on discovery,250 noted that arbitration decisions were “final 
and binding”251 and noted a waiver of the right to trial before a jury 
or court.252 Kaiser claimed that it was the employer’s responsibility 
to make the group agreement available to the employees to re-
view.253 
The pertinent medical facts involve the patient’s “persistent 
upper abdominal pain”254 and his diagnosis with “a very rare, ag-
gressive and fatal form of cancer”255 that would be treated through 
Kaiser with “a complete surgical resection of [the patient’s] stom-
ach and esophagus.”256 The patient sought a second opinion at a 
university medical center, which concluded Kaiser’s diagnosis was 
incorrect and different treatment was required.257 The patient re-
mained there for treatment, and Kaiser refused to cover the costs.258 
The patient filed suit against Kaiser based on multiple theories 
of liability, including medical negligence, and “sought a declara-
tion that the mandatory arbitration requirement” was void and un-
enforceable claiming it “provides an adjudicatory process that is 
unconscionable and heavily biased in Kaiser’s favor.”259 The patient 
also alleged “that the arbitration provision is a provision of adhe-
sion for which [the patient] had neither choice nor bargaining 
 
 246.  Siopes v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 312 P.3d 869 (Haw. 2013). 
 247.  Id.at 871–72. 
 248.  Id. at 872. 
 249.  Id. at 872–73. 
 250.  Id. at 873. 
 251.  Id. at 874. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. at 875. 
 255.  Id. See generally Hannah H. Wong & Peiguo Chu, Immunohistochemical Fea-
tures of the Gastrointestinal Tract Tumors, 3 J. GASTROINTESTINAL ONCOLOGY 262 (Sept. 
2012), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3418530/. 
 256.  Siopes, 312 P.3d at 875. 
 257.  Id. at 876. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
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power to challenge.”260 Kaiser responded by filing a “Motion to 
Compel Arbitration and Motion to Stay Discovery pending the rul-
ing on the motion to compel.”261 Essentially, the patient’s position 
was that he was completely unaware of the arbitration provision.262 
The trial court disagreed with the patient and compelled arbitra-
tion.263 
The Hawaii Supreme Court focused on contract formation, 
stating that “the issue is whether [the patient] assented to the arbi-
tration provision in the first instance, when he enrolled in the Kai-
ser plan by signing the Enrollment Form.”264 The court found an 
absence of mutual assent, reasoning the patient was uninformed of 
the arbitration provision or that it would be binding upon him, rul-
ing he could not be compelled to participate in arbitration.265 
Finally, the court noted that the trial court erred by not con-
sidering the unconscionability issue. The court vacated the trial 
court’s orders with respect to arbitration and sent the case back to 
the trial court for further proceedings.266 
H. What Have We Learned So Far? 
Having surveyed the judicial opinions of various states on the 
issue of the compulsory arbitration of medical negligence claims, a 
rather simple, unhelpful fact is apparent. Courts, primarily using a 
basic contract law analysis, may find compulsory arbitration agree-
ments covering medical negligence claims enforceable or unen-
forceable. If forming the physician-patient relationship is seen as a 
business transaction, a court will be more likely to enforce an arbi-
tration agreement on the theory that the agreement is legible, not 
hidden, and furthers the policy of the state in preferring arbitra-
tion as an efficient and cost-conscious method of alternative dis-
pute resolution. The physician-patient relationship, however, does 
not derive from an arm’s-length business negotiation. Some courts 
have recognized the vulnerability of patients, including potential 
literacy issues. Patients are likely to execute whatever documents 
are necessary in order to receive treatment. Courts may understand 
 
 260.  Id. at 876–77. 
 261.  Id. at 877. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. at 880. 
 265.  Id. at 885. 
 266.  Id. 
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basic principles of contract law but, in my estimation, they typically 
neither understand medicine nor seek to learn about it when this 
knowledge can usefully inform judicial decision making.267 
Medicine should provide some helpful information about 
compulsory arbitration. The remainder of this paper will search 
medicine in an effort to discover why medicine encourages patients 
to execute arbitration agreements as a condition of treatment and 
whether this practice is medically ethical. 
VIII. THE MEDICAL PROFESSION HAS SUPPORTED BINDING 
ARBITRATION OF MEDICAL LIABILITY CLAIMS 
I do not profess to know when a patient was first asked to exe-
cute an arbitration agreement as a condition of treatment or when 
a physician first thought to engage in this practice. It is, however, 
possible to trace physician support for binding arbitration of medi-
cal liability claims to 1975. In April of 1975, the president of the 
American Society of Internal Medicine (ASIM), Glenn Molyneaux, 
M.D., provided “Testimony on Medical Liability” to the Senate 
Subcommittee on Health.268 This testimony, undoubtedly related to 
tort reform, emphasized that some “undesirable [medical] out-
comes follow appropriate medical care” and that the legal system 
fails to distinguish these events from medical negligence.269 The 
ASIM proposed legislative “reform of the entire legal process as it 
relates to medical liability,” and suggested “that some form of arbi-
tration would be the most equitable for all parties concerned.”270 In 
fact, in this testimony, the ASIM suggested binding arbitration as a 
substitute for the jury trial.271 The testimony did not address medi-
 
 267.  This is a problem to which I have previously alluded. See supra notes 204–
11 and accompanying text; see also Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 
2013) (providing Judge Posner’s commentary on a court’s understanding of medi-
cine). 
 268.  See AM. SOC’Y INTERNAL MED., TESTIMONY ON MED. LIAB., 94th Cong., at 1 
(1975), https://www.acponline.org/acp_policy/testimony/medical_liability 
_testimony_before_subcommitte_health_us_senate_1975.pdf (“[The] ASIM is a 
federation of 51 component societies of internal medicine. It has more than 
13,500 members who, by training and practice standards, are recognized as spe-
cialists in internal medicine. Most are private practice internists delivering primary 
care, subspecialty care or both.”) (statement of Glenn Molyneaux, President, 
Amer. Soc. Internal Med.). 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id. at 3. 
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cal treatment conditioned on the patient’s execution of an arbitra-
tion agreement. 
The American College of Physicians (ACP)272 has rather vigor-
ously supported voluntary arbitration for medical liability claims. Its 
informational paper from March 1989, on “Medical Professional 
Liability” supported “voluntary binding arbitration” as a compo-
nent of tort reform.273 This informational paper was followed by the 
ACP’s position paper, “Restructuring The Medical Professional Li-
ability System,” which similarly supported arbitration as a tort re-
form measure.274 The ACP’s 2003 position paper, “Reforming The 
Medical Professional Liability Insurance System” endorsed federal 
tort reform legislation, which included authorizing the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services “to make grants to states for the devel-
opment and implementation of ADR programs.”275 The ACP reiter-
ated this recommendation in 2006276 and 2014.277 In 2014, the 
American College of Surgeons (ACS)278 commented on arbitration 
of medical liability claims. It published Surgeons and Medical Lia-
bility: A Guide to Understanding Medical Liability Reform, a “pri-
mer to inform ACS fellows about the history of medical liability as 
well as alternative, innovative reform approaches to the status quo 
of tort law in the U.S.”279 In this publication, the ACS referred to, 
 
 272.  See AM. COLL. PHYSICIANS, http://www.acponline.org/about_acp/who 
_we_are (last visited Jan 30, 2016) (“[The ACP] is a national organization of in-
ternists” and “is the largest medical-specialty organization and second largest phy-
sician group in the United States.”). 
 273.  AM. COLL. PHYSICIANS, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY at 4 (1986), 
http://www.acponline.org/acp_policy/policies/medical_professional_liability_19
84.pdf (last visited Oct.18, 2015). 
 274.  AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, RESTRUCTURING THE MEDICAL 
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY SYSTEM at 3, 4, 5, 16, 17 (1986). 
 275.  AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, REFORMING THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL 
LIABILITY INSURANCE SYSTEM at 11 (2003). 
 276.  AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, EXPLORING THE USE OF HEALTH 
COURTS—ADDENDUM TO “REFORMING THE MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY SYSTEM” 
at 4 (2006). 
 277.  AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM: INNOVATIVE 
SOLUTIONS FOR A NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM at 5, 15 (2014). 
 278.  AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, http://www.facs.org/about-acs (last vis-
ited October 2, 2015) (“The American College of Surgeons (ACS) is a scientific 
and educational association of surgeons that was founded in 1913 to improve the 
quality of care for the surgical patient by setting high standards for surgical educa-
tion and practice”).  
 279.  KATHLEEN M. O’NEILL ET AL., THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, 
SURGEONS AND MEDICAL LIABILITY: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL LIABILITY 
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but did not recommend, mandatory pre-dispute binding arbitra-
tion, stating that “the American Arbitration Association . . . does 
not endorse mandatory [pre-dispute] binding arbitration for medi-
cal liability cases. They [sic] do not believe a sick patient has a fair 
amount of bargaining power when deciding whether or not to ac-
cept the arbitration contract.”280 Indeed, it seems that the ACS de-
sires that physicians and patients understand that alternative dis-
pute resolution is an option.281 
The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG),282 through its Committee on Professional Liability, issued 
a Committee opinion entitled “Predispute, Voluntary, Binding Ar-
bitration” in 2014.283 ACOG’s opinion appears supportive of arbitra-
tion of medical liability claims, but steadfastly emphasizes the need 
for “voluntariness”284 and that the physician cannot refuse treat-
ment to a patient who refuses to execute the arbitration agree-
ment.285 This is a laudable position, as it respects the vulnerability of 
patients and the environment surrounding the physician-patient 
relationship, including the initial patient visit.286 
At this juncture, it is fair to state that some courts have en-
forced arbitration agreements executed by patients as a condition 
of treatment. Furthermore, influential professional medical associ-
ations have advocated the use of arbitration agreements covering 
potential medical liability claims. In my estimation, this is regretta-
 
REFORM 4 (2014). 
 280.  Id. at 17 (citing Erik Moller, Elizabeth Rolph & John Rolph, Arbitration 
Agreements in Health Care: Myths and Reality, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. at 153 (1997). 
 281.  O’NEILL ET AL., supra note 279, at 41. 
 282.  The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ objectives 
are “to foster and stimulate improvements in all aspects of the health care of wom-
en; to establish and maintain the highest standards of practice; to promote high 
ethical standards; to establish and promote policy positions on issues affecting the 
specialty of obstetrics and gynecology; and to promote, represent, and advance the 
professional and socioeconomic interests of its members.” AM. CONG. OF 
OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, BYLAWS 1 (2015). 
 283.  THE AMERICAN CONGRESS OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS 
COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, Predispute, Voluntary, Binding Arbitration, 583 
COMMITTEE OPINION 1 (Jan. 2014).  
 284.  Id. at 2. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  See David H. Sohn, Negligence, Genuine Error, and Litigation, 6 INT’L J. GEN. 
MED. 49, 53 (2013) (noting that the practice of requiring the execution of an arbi-
tration agreement as a condition of treatment may lead to an awkward discussion 
of “adversarial postures during the initial physician-patient visit”). 
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ble but should not end the inquiry. Recognizing that the patients 
who are asked to execute arbitration agreements may be ill, in 
pain, medicated, fearful, unwilling to confront a physician, and 
simply incapable of understanding the gravity of the arbitration 
agreement, another inquiry remains: is the practice of requiring 
patients to execute arbitration agreements as a condition of treat-
ment medically ethical? 
IX. IS THE PRACTICE OF REQUIRING PATIENTS TO EXECUTE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AS A CONDITION OF TREATMENT 
MEDICALLY ETHICAL? 
A. The Hippocratic Oath 
I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and 
Panaceia and all the gods and goddesses, making them my witness, 
that I will fulfill according to my ability and judgment this oath and 
this covenant: 
To hold him who has taught me this art as equal to my 
parents and to live my life in partnership with him, and if 
he is in need of money to give him a share of mine, and to 
regard his offspring as equal to my brothers in male line-
age and to teach them this art—if they desire to learn it—
without fee and covenant; to give a share of precepts and 
oral instruction and all the other learning to my sons and 
to the sons of him who has instructed me and to pupils 
who have signed the covenant and have taken an oath ac-
cording to the medical law, but to no one else.  
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick 
according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them 
from harm and injustice.  
I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, 
nor will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will 
not give to a woman an abortive remedy. In purity and ho-
liness I will guard my life and my art.  
I will not use the knife, nor even on sufferers from stone, 
but will withdraw in favor of such men as are engaged in 
this work.  
Whatever house I may visit, I will come for the benefit of 
the sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all 
mischief and in particular sexual relations with both fe-
male and male persons, be they free or slaves.  
36
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 20
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/20
8. Ginsberg (273-318) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2016  9:51 AM 
2016] THE EXECUTION OF AN ARBITRATION PROVISION 309 
Whatever I may see or hear in the course of the treatment 
in regard to the life of men, which on no account one 
must spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such 
things shameful to be spoken about.  
If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted 
to me to enjoy life and art, being honored with fame 
among all men for all time to come; if I transgress it and 
swear falsely, may the opposite of all this be my lot.287 
It has been well noted that “[t]he Hippocratic Oath has stood 
as a major document of medical ethics from antiquity to the cur-
rent day.”288 The Oath is routinely administered to medical stu-
dents.289 Abundant scholarship makes clear that “there is no such 
thing as a single, fixed Hippocratic Oath”290 and the original author 
of the Oath is unknown.291 If the Oath has continued traction for 
medical ethics, does it at all assist in determining if the practice of 
requiring a patient to execute an arbitration agreement as a condi-
tion of treatment is medically ethical? 
An examination of the Oath immediately reveals a problem 
with its ethical depth. It focuses on the physician and only minimal-
ly speaks to the rights of patients, by nominal references to “injus-
tice.”292 The historically recent value attached to patient autonomy 
and informed consent is not expressed in classical versions of the 
Oath.293 Also absent are “commitments to patient rights.”294 
Insofar as the Oath compels physicians to “keep [patients] 
from harm and injustice,”295 it seems to me that the Oath speaks to 
a broad ethical principle—that a physician should avoid using his 
or her position of power to take advantage of a vulnerable patient. 
 
 287.  Lisa R. Hasday, The Hippocratic Oath as Literary Text: A Dialogue Between 
Law and Medicine, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 299, 299 (2002) (citing Lud-
wig Edelstein, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH 3 (1943)). 
 288.  Hasday, supra note 287 at 301. 
 289.  Id. at 302. See also Lisa Keränen, The Hippocratic Oath as Epideictic Rhetoric: 
Reanimating Medicine’s Past for Its Future, 22 J. MED. HUMANITIES 55, 57 (2001); Emi-
ly Woodbury, The Fall of the Hippocratic Oath: Why the Hippocratic Oath Should Be Dis-
carded in Favor of a Modified Version of Pellegrino’s Precepts, 6 GEO. U. J. HEALTH SCIS. 9 
(2012); Samuel J. Huber, The White Coat Ceremony: A Contemporary Medical Ritual, 29 
J. MED. ETHICS 364, 364 (2003). 
 290.  Keränen, supra note 289, at 56.  
 291.  Id. at 57. 
 292.  Hasday, supra note 287, at 302–03. 
 293.  Keränen,.supra note 289, at 60. 
 294.  Id.  
 295.  Hasday, supra note 287, at 299. 
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Vulnerable patients include those who are ill, medicated, scared, 
intimidated by their circumstances—including those who are liter-
ally on the precipice of treatment—and those challenged by issues 
of literacy to understand what they are told and what they are asked 
to read and sign. “Injustice” is an ominous and broad concept. Re-
quiring a patient to execute an arbitration agreement as a condi-
tion of treatment may very well constitute an “injustice.” 
More modern versions of the Oath are the subject of comment 
in medical literature. It is significant that a more modern version of 
the Oath may “include assurances of . . . protection of patients’ au-
tonomy, and informed consent or assistance with decision mak-
ing.”296 This ethical commitment may very well be at odds with re-
quiring a patient to execute an arbitration agreement as a 
condition of treatment. 
If the Oath, at least implicitly, is inconsistent with the practice 
of requiring the execution of the arbitration agreement as a condi-
tion of treatment, could it have legal significance? In other words, 
does the Oath have the force of law? 
Unquestionably, courts recognize the existence of the Oath in 
various contexts.297 However, courts also recognize that ethical 
standards and codes “are aspirational in nature and not enforcea-
ble by law”298 and “that ethical standards levied within the medical 
community are not binding on courts.”299 If a court is not bound by 
a statement of medical ethics, then might a court take such an ethi-
cal standard into account as an unconscionability factor or as evi-
dence of the medical professional’s standard of care? If so, that a 
medical ethical principle or standard is not “the law” would not 
prohibit its consideration in determining the enforceability of the 
 
 296.  Howard Markel, “I Swear by Apollo”—On Taking the Hippocratic Oath, 350 
N. ENG. J. MED. 2026, 2028 (2004); Robert D. Orr et al., Use of the Hippocratic Oath: 
A Review of Twentieth Century Practice and a Content Analysis of Oaths Administered in 
Medical School in the U.S. and Canada in 1993, 8 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 377, 382 (1997). 
 297.  See, e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(Physician inquiry into patient private matters); O’Rear v. R.H., 69 So. 3d 106 
(Ala. 2011) (Sexual contact with patient); Acosta v. Richter, 671 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 
1996); Morrison v. Malmquist, 62 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1953) (Disclosure of privileged 
information); Finucan v. Md. Bd. Physician Quality Servs., 846 A.2d 377 (Md. 
2004) (Physician not to engage in sexual relationship with patient); Bryson v. 
Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110 (Okla. 1988) (Disclosure of confidences); Steinberg v. 
Jensen, 534 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1995) (Confidentiality). 
 298.  Bryson, 749 P.2d at 114. 
 299.  Caldwell v. Chauvin, 464 S.W.3d 139, 156 (Ky. 2015). 
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arbitration agreement executed by the patient as a condition of 
treatment. Therefore, an examination of various codes of medical 
ethics is warranted. 
B. American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics 
The AMA300 has published a Code of Medical Ethics,301 which 
contains principles of medical ethics and opinions of the Council 
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs.302 The following principles and 
opinions may have relevance to the practice of requiring patients to 
execute arbitration agreements as a condition of treatment: 
Preamble 
The medical profession has long subscribed to a body of 
ethical statements developed primarily for the benefit of 
the patient. As a member of this profession, a physician 
must recognize responsibility to patients first and fore-
most, as well as to society, to other health professionals, 
and to self. The following Principles adopted by the 
American Medical Association are not laws, but standards 
of conduct that define the essentials of honorable behav-
ior for the physician. . . . 
VI. A physician shall, in the provision of appropriate pa-
tient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom 
to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in 
which to provide medical care. . . . 
IX. A physician shall support access to medical care for all 
people.303 
 
Opinion 8.0501—Professionalism and Contractual Relations 
 
 300.  The AMA, established in 1847, is a voluntary medical association that 
“has promoted scientific advancement, improved public health, and invested in 
the doctor and patient relationship.” See Our History, AM. MED. ASS’N, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-history.page (last visited Jan 
30, 2016). In 2012, the AMA had 224,503 members. AM. MED. ASS’N, REPORT ON 
PERFORMANCE, ACTIVITIES, AND STATUS IN 2012, 9 (2013).  
 301.  AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2014). 
 302.  “The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) is one of three com-
ponents of the Ethics Group of the American Medical Association,” which “has two 
key responsibilities: To maintain and update the . . . Code of Medical Ethics,” and 
“[t]o promote adherence to the professional ethical standards set out in the Code 
though its judicial function.” Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AM. MED. ASS’N, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/ama-councils 
/council-ethical-judicial-affairs.page (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 303.  CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 301 at xv. 
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Physicians are free to enter into a wide range of contrac-
tual arrangements. However, physicians should not sign 
contracts containing provisions that may undermine their 
ethical obligation to advocate for patient welfare. There-
fore, before entering into contractual agreements to pro-
vide services that directly or indirectly impact patient care, 
physicians should negotiate the removal of any terms, 
such as financial incentives or administrative conditions, 
that are known to compromise professional judgment or 
integrity. Particularly, when contractual compensation 
varies according to performance (see Opinion 8.054, “Fi-
nancial Incentives and the Practice of Medicine”), physi-
cians should beware of incentives that may adversely im-
pact patient care. (VI, VIII)304 
 
Opinion 9.06—Free Choice 
Free choice of physicians is the right of every individual. 
One may select and change at will one’s physicians, or 
one may choose a medical care plan such as that provided 
by a closed panel or group practice or health mainte-
nance or service organization. The individual’s freedom 
to select a preferred system of health care and free com-
petition among physicians and alternative systems of care 
are prerequisites of ethical practice and optimal patient 
care. 
In choosing to subscribe to a health maintenance or ser-
vice organization or in choosing or accepting treatment in 
a particular hospital, the patient is thereby accepting limi-
tations upon free choice of medical services. 
The need of an individual for emergency treatment in 
cases of accident or sudden illness may, as a practical mat-
ter, preclude free choice of a physician, particularly where 
there is loss of consciousness. 
Although the concept of free choice ensures that an indi-
vidual can generally choose a physician, likewise a physi-
cian may decline to accept that individual as a patient. In 
selecting the physician of choice, the patient may some-
times be obliged to pay for medical services that might 
otherwise be paid by a third party. (VI)305 
 
Opinion 9.0651—Financial Barriers to Health Care Access 
 
 304.  Id. at 246. 
 305.  Id. at 355. 
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Health care is a fundamental human good because it af-
fects our opportunity to pursue life goals, reduces our 
pain and suffering, helps prevent premature loss of life, 
and provides information needed to plan for our lives. As 
professionals, physicians individually and collectively have 
an ethical responsibility to ensure that all persons have 
access to needed care regardless of their economic means. 
In view of this obligation: 
(1) Individual physicians should take steps to promote ac-
cess to care for individual patients. 
(2) Individual physicians should help patients obtain 
needed care through public or charitable programs when 
patients cannot do so themselves. 
(3) Physicians, individually and collectively through their 
professional organizations and institutions, should partic-
ipate in the political process as advocates for patients (or 
support those who do) so as to diminish financial obsta-
cles to access health care. 
(4) The medical profession must work to ensure that so-
cietal decisions about the distribution of health resources 
safeguard the interests of all patients and promote access 
to health services.306 
 
Opinion 9.12—Patient-Physician Relationship: Respect for Law 
and Human Rights 
The creation of the patient-physician relationship is con-
tractual in nature. Generally, both the physician and the 
patient are free to enter into or decline the relationship. 
A physician may decline to undertake the care of a patient 
whose medical condition is not within the physician’s cur-
rent competence. However, physicians who offer their 
services to the public may not decline to accept patients 
because of race, color, religion, national origin, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or any other basis that would 
constitute invidious discrimination. Furthermore, physi-
cians who are obligated under pre-existing contractual ar-
rangements may not decline to accept patients as provid-
ed by those arrangements. (I, III, V, VI)307 
 
Opinion 10.05—Potential Patients 
(1) Physicians must keep their professional obligations to 
 
 306.  Id. at 361. 
 307.  Id. at 379. 
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provide care to patients in accord with their prerogative 
to choose whether to enter into a patient-physician rela-
tionship. . . . 
(4) Physicians, as professionals and members of society, 
should work to ensure access to adequate health care 
(Opinion 10.01, “Fundamental Elements of the Patient-
Physician Relationship”). Accordingly, physicians have an 
obligation to share in providing charity care (Opinion 
9.065, “Caring for the Poor”) but not to the degree that 
would seriously compromise the care provided to existing 
patients. When deciding whether to take on a new pa-
tient, physicians should consider the individual’s need for 
medical service along with the needs of their current pa-
tients. Greater medical necessity of a service engenders a 
stronger obligation to treat. (I, VI, VIII, IX)308 
Distilled from the aforementioned principles and opinions are 
a few common threads, sometimes laudable, sometimes conflicting. 
The AMA clearly promotes patient access to healthcare and free-
dom of contract. Patients should be able to choose their physicians 
but physicians are not obligated to accept all patients. Contracts en-
tered into by physician should not contain “provisions that may 
undermine their ethical obligation to advocate for patient wel-
fare.”309 Here, the AMA may not have contemplated the ethical 
ramifications of arbitration provisions but the required execution 
of these provisions is arguably not in the best interests of patients. 
C. American College of Physicians (ACP) Ethics Manual 
The ACP “is a national organization of internists,”310 “the larg-
est medical-specialty organization and second-largest physician 
group in the United States.”311 The ACP’s Ethical Manual, Sixth 
Edition, was published in 2012. 
The introductory portion of the ethics manual provides that 
“[c]urrent understanding of medical ethics is based on the princi-
ples from which positive duties emerge.”312 Included in these ethi-
 
 308.  Id. at 422. 
 309.  Id. at 246. 
 310.  AM. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, http://www.acponline.org/about_acp 
/who_we_are (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 311.  Id; see also Charles S. Bryan, The Art of Medicine—Osler Redux: the American 
College of Physicians at 100, 385 LANCET 1720 (2015). 
 312.  Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, 156 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 73, 74 (2012). 
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cal principles “is respect for patient autonomy—the duty to protect 
and foster a patient’s free, uncoerced choices.”313 The practice of 
requiring the execution of an arbitration agreement as a condition 
of treatment appears coercive and inconsistent with this principle. 
The section of the manual entitled “The Physician and the Pa-
tient” recognizes “the imbalance of power between patient and 
physician.”314 The imbalance of power relates to patient vulnerabil-
ity, a topic previously discussed in this article, which should be con-
sidered by courts in determining the unconscionability of an arbi-
tration agreement. 
The section of the manual entitled “Initiating and Discontinu-
ing the Patient-Physician Relationship” requires the physician to 
“work toward an understanding of the patient’s health problems, 
concerns, goals and expectations. . . . The physician has a duty to 
promote patient understanding and should be aware of barriers, 
including health literacy issues for the patient.”315 Should a patient 
expect to execute an arbitration agreement that the patient does 
not understand? I believe the answer is a resounding, “No.” 
Finally, in the section of the manual entitled “The Changing 
Practice Environment,” the physician is admonished that the physi-
cian is the patient’s health care agent and must advocate “through 
the necessary avenues to obtain treatment that is essential to the 
individual patient’s care regardless of the barriers that may dis-
courage the physician from doing so.”316 The practice of requiring 
the execution of an arbitration agreement as a condition of treat-
ment appears inconsistent with the duty of patient advocacy and 
with an agent’s classic duty of loyalty.317 
D. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) Code of Ethics 
and Professionalism for Orthopedic Surgeons 
The AAOS “is the preeminent provider of musculosketal edu-
cation to orthopaedic surgeons and others in the world.”318 It has 
published a “Code of Ethics and Professionalism for Orthopedic 
 
 313.  Id. 
 314.  Id. at 75. 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  Id. at 87. 
 317.  See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, § 68 (3d 
ed. 2001). 
 318.  AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS, About the AAOS, 
http://www.aaos.org/about/about.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
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Surgeons,” “primarily for the benefit of . . . patients”319 and ortho-
pedic surgeons, and to “serve as guides for conduct of the physician 
in the physician-patient relationship.”320 The following are excerpts 
of the AAOS Code: 
The Physician-Patient Relationship 
A. The orthopaedic profession exists for the primary pur-
pose of caring for the patient. The physician-patient rela-
tionship is the central focus of all ethical concerns. 
B. The physician-patient relationship has a contractual ba-
sis and is based on confidentiality, trust, and honesty. 
Both the patient and the orthopaedic surgeon are free to 
enter or discontinue the relationship within any existing 
constraints of a contract with a third party. . . . 
C. The orthopaedic surgeon may choose whom he or she 
will serve. . . .  
Relationship to the Public 
. . . . 
D. The orthopaedic surgeon may enter into a contractual 
relationship with a group, a prepaid practice plan, or a 
hospital. The physician has an obligation to serve as the 
patient’s advocate and to ensure that the patient’s welfare 
remains the paramount concern.321 
These principles are quite similar to those previously dis-
cussed. They reveal the inherent conflict between the autonomy of 
the physician and the physician’s duty to serve and advocate for the 
patient. Again, the practice of requiring patients to execute arbitra-
tion agreements as a condition of treatment seems at odds with the 
duty to advocate on behalf of vulnerable patients. 
X. PATIENT LITERACY 
A brief mention of literacy is appropriate here. Much has been 
written about health literacy and general literacy in the population. 
It is not an understatement to suggest that it is a challenge for pa-
tients to communicate with their physicians and to understand 
health related information they are given.322 Laypersons with lim-
ited literacy are unlikely to understand medicine. This problem is 
 
 319.  AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPEDIC SURGEONS, Code of Ethics and Profes-
sionalism for Orthopedic Surgeons, http://www.aaos.org/about/papers/ethics 
/code.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). 
 320.  Id. 
 321.  Id. 
 322.  Williams, supra note 126. 
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exacerbated when a patient is given an arbitration agreement to 
execute. What is the likelihood that a patient will understand a le-
gal document of such significance?323 Here, neither the physician 
nor the physician’s office can meaningfully advocate for the pa-
tient. As non-lawyers, they cannot advise the patient of the legal 
impact of executing the agreement. Patient literacy should consti-
tute a component of the unconscionability discussion. I suggest 
that challenges to patient literacy support a presumption that arbi-
tration agreements covering medical liability claims, executed as a 
condition of treatment, are unconscionable. 
XI. CONCLUSION  
Physicians Should Abandon the Practice of Requiring Patients to Execute 
Arbitration Agreements as a Condition of Treatment: Courts Should Hold 
These Agreements Unconscionable 
Forcing a patient to execute an arbitration agreement as a 
condition of treatment is simply an unfortunate, and possibly un-
ethical, aspect of medical practice. Physicians must recognize that 
patients are not consumers involved in commercial transactions. I 
am not advocating consumer arbitration of disputes in other con-
texts. My point is that the patient is different than the classic con-
sumer in significant respects, well described recently by Goldstein 
and Bowers as follows: 
[A]n individual’s use of the health care system is likely to 
be involuntary and, in this sense, necessary. . . . As com-
pared to other marketplace transactions, this results in an 
almost powerless buyer. . . . Envisioning the individual as a 
consumer might result in a more business-like attitude 
towards the interaction on the part of the physician. . . . 
Instead of a collaborative decision-making process, the in-
teractions could become adversarial.324 
As mentioned earlier in this paper, patients are ill, anxious, 
frightened, dependent, in need of treatment, often medicated, and 
often challenged with literacy issues. Patients, in general, are un-
likely to understand arbitration agreements, will not likely have the 
wherewithal, resources or time necessary to seek an attorney’s opin-
ion on the agreement, and will likely sign whatever documents are 
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given to them in order to begin medical treatment. These prob-
lems are even more extreme when the arbitration agreement is giv-
en to the patient who is about to undergo a procedure that will not 
be performed if the patient “elects” not to execute the agreement. 
Physicians should be patient advocates. Various principles of 
medical ethics, previously discussed, typically evidence a collision 
course of physician and patient interests. Physicians should enjoy 
the freedom of contract and the right to choose their patients, 
within reason. But patients need access to health care, and physi-
cians should advocate for patients in this regard. Physicians should 
not force arbitration agreements upon patients. Doing so simply 
sets an adversarial tone to the physician-patient relationship.325 
Courts considering the enforceability of adhesive arbitration 
provisions covering medical liability claims should refer to medical 
ethical principles as well as patient characteristics and conclude 
that these provisions are unconscionable. It is not reasonable to re-
quire patients to waive fundamental legal rights when they are most 
vulnerable and in need of healthcare. 
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